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David A. Wise 
This volume analyzes pay and employment in the public and private 
sectors. Chapters 2 through 6 consider various aspects of military com- 
pensation and employment; the remainder focus on labor issues in other 
governmental units. We  find that (1) military personnel receive rela- 
tively high pay compared to their civilian counterparts; (2) the military 
pension  system is an important part  of  compensation in the armed 
forces, and it implies an attendant large unfunded liability; (3) military 
hiring is an important part of  youth employment; (4)  earnings in the 
federal civil service are somewhat higher than comparable private earn- 
ings, but in general, pay in the public versus private sector varies greatly 
over time and by level of government; (5) government pensions are 
typically generous relative to private pensions, and their incentive ef- 
fects vary dramatically among government units; (6) salaries for public 
teachers and minimum standards for teacher certification  should be 
considered jointly. 
1.1  Military versus Civilian Pay and Employment 
Several chapters in this volume focus on compensation in the armed 
forces, its relationship to compensation in the private sector, and the 
interaction between military employment and private sector employ- 
ment of  youths. In Chapter 2,  “Military  versus Civilian Pay: A De- 
scriptive Discussion,”  Douglas Phillips and David Wise compare the 
compensation of those who follow a career in the military to the com- 
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pensation similar individuals could expect if they followed a career in 
the civilian sector. The chapter first compares the compensation of 
military enlisted personnel with the compensation of high school grad- 
uates in the civilian sector, and then compares the compensation of 
officers with the compensation of college graduates in the civilian sector. 
Until 1967, military pay was much lower than wages or salaries in 
the private sector. However, the federal Pay Comparability Act of 1967 
mandated that basic pay schedules and other elements of regular mil- 
itary compensation be adjusted to increases in wage rates in the private 
sector. The act states that military wages must be indexed to wage 
increases in the federal civil service, which in turn are indexed to wages 
in the private sector. One might conclude that this makes a comparison 
of military and civilian compensation a tautological exercise. However, 
the nonsalary components of compensation are very different in the 
two sectors, even if regular salaries were truly comparable. In addition, 
an important component of the comparison is the potential earnings of 
military personnel after retirement from the military service. 
The authors emphasize that it is not possible to make precise com- 
parisons of potential earnings of  identical individuals in the military 
versus the private sector. Therefore, the comparisons must be taken 
only as indications of the order of magnitude of earnings potential in 
the two sectors. Some sensitivity analysis is undertaken to determine 
the effect on the comparisons of critical assumptions. 
The authors estimate that the total potential lifetime compensation 
of enlisted career military personnel is between 1.4 and 1.7 times the 
average lifetime compensation of high school graduates; the total po- 
tential compensation of officers is between l .6 and l .9  times the lifetime 
compensation of the average college graduate. 
Much of this difference between military and civilian compensation 
is  the result  of  the very  generous  military  pension  system. Before 
twenty years of service, accrued pension wealth in the military is zero; 
at twenty years of  service it jumps to between $1 17,000 and $151,000 
(in 1978 dollars) for enlisted personnel, depending on rank, and from 
$260,000 to $277,000 for officers. These amounts are typically between 
50 and 60 percent  of total earnings during the first twenty  years of 
service. In comparison, the typical high school graduate with a pension 
plan would have approximately $12,000 in accrued pension wealth after 
working twenty years. 
Many military personnel leave the military and take a civilian job 
before they retire from the labor force. A large number of them accrue 
private pension wealth. In addition, military personnel accumulate So- 
cial Security wealth. As a consequence, the public plus private pension 
wealth of career enlisted personnel at age sixty-two is between 1.5 and 
2.5 times the pension wealth of the typical high school graduate with 3  Overview 
a private pension. At age sixty-two, career oficers have two to three 
times the public plus private pension wealth of typical college graduates 
with private pensions. While Social Security wealth is about the same 
for military personnel as for civilians, private pension wealth is about 
twice as high for civilians as for military careerists. Nonetheless, this 
difference is swamped by the value of the military pension. 
Using descriptive data, the authors also conclude that the military 
pension  system provides a strong inducement for those with five or 
more years of service to remain for twenty years, at which time their 
pension benefits become available. After that, pension benefits appar- 
ently provide a strong incentive for retirement, unless future promo- 
tions in the service and resulting increases in pension wealth offset the 
otherwise foregone benefits. 
In chapter 3, entitled  “Investing  in the Defense Work Force: The 
Debt and Structure of Military Pensions,”  Herman Leonard looks at 
the military retirement system (MRS) and the alternative to it proposed 
by the Grace Commission. His simulation results focus on the annual 
cost in accumulated unfunded liabilities of the alternative systems, and 
on the work incentives that these systems create. 
Recently the military pension system has been widely criticized. The 
Congressional Budget Office, the General Accounting Office, the Office 
of  the Actuary in the Department of Defense, the Fifth Quadrennial 
Review of  Militaly Compensation, the President’s Private Sector Sur- 
vey  on Cost Control (the Grace Commission), and countless  other 
public and private researchers have scrutinized the military pension 
system. All  have found  that the  system imposes a very  substantial 
obligation on taxpayers for future payments. These studies have sug- 
gested a wide range of changes in the form, level, availability, timing, 
and composition of military retirement benefits. 
There are two quite different reasons to examine the MRS. First, 
and most important, it provides fully 30 percent of the total compen- 
sation paid to military personnel. Pension rights represent an additional 
60 percent increment to basic cash salary payments. Since only about 
15 percent  of  armed forces  members actually  collect pensions,  the 
pensions component of compensation for those who do collect is an 
even larger fraction of total pay. 
The pensions portion of military compensation is also important be- 
cause its pattern of accrual over the employee’s working life is quite 
different from the pattern of salaries. Although the MRS provides no 
regular retirement benefits to those who leave with fewer than twenty 
years of service, the relatively generous benefits paid to people who 
work longer than twenty years provide a considerable incentive to stay 
in  the service. The benefits also increase  substantially if  the career 
extends beyond  twenty years. In that case, however,  the annuity is 4  DavidA. Wise 
received for fewer years. Moreover, one’s options to work outside the 
military are reduced because there are fewer years left in which to 
build a second career. All of this constitutes a complex trade-off, and 
one of the principal components of the trade is the level and structure 
of accrual of pension benefits. 
The MRS also has a substantial impact on the retention, and, con- 
ceivably, the recruitment of  military personnel.  Indeed, it is fair to 
observe, as the Office of the Actuary did recently, that “The military 
retirement system is not an old-age pension system normally found in 
the private sector. . . . Rather it is a system specifically designed to 
complement the management of the active force, and is a function of 
the military pay and allowance compensation structure” (Department 
of Defense 1983, 1). The MRS is said to be explicitly designed to help 
the military keep the right people, to minimize the costs of retraining, 
and to maintain an effective fighting force. What incentives does it truly 
provide, and at what expense? Leonard emphasizes that  alternative 
proposals should be examined in light of the changes they would induce 
in the structure of retirement incentives. He shows that the MRS rep- 
resents a very large public investment in retention of military personnel 
and asks whether the same funds spent in different ways would have 
more impact on strengthening the nation’s defenses? 
A second reason to examine the MRS is that its obligations to provide 
retirement income are not backed by any financial assets. These ob- 
ligations are commitments to pay, and they represent a considerable 
dedication of future tax revenues or other revenues.  Since these ob- 
ligations represent real claims, taxpayers and government officials should 
know their approximate magnitude, Leonard argues. That knowledge 
would provide a more accurate picture of the “financial condition” of 
the government-that  is, a more accurate accounting to taxpayers of 
one of their major future obligations. It might also have an important 
impact on current decisions. Estimating the current equivalent salary 
cost of  pension promises being rendered would facilitate estimates of 
the true cost of labor to the armed services. Such estimates, Leonard 
points out, are also necessary to assess correctly labor-saving capital 
investment. 
Leonard finds that the military retirement system represents an ac- 
cumulated taxpayer debt of  about $525 billion. Its full funding rate is 
over 40  percent  of  payroll  costs.  (In a paper  presented  elsewhere, 
Laurence J. Kotlikoff and Wise [1984] find that the funding rate of the 
typical private pension plan is about 5 percent of payroll cost.) Indi- 
viduals retiring with twenty years of military service often receive more 
in pension compensation than they did in wages over the period they 
worked. In part this is a result  of  the full cost-of-living indexing of 5  Overview 
military pensions. Leonard also emphasizes that the MRS provides an 
enormous incentive to serve up to the time of retirement eligibility at 
twenty years, and then a smaller but still significant incentive to serve 
beyond that time. 
The Grace Commission proposes a dramatic reduction in benefits. 
Pensions would be reduced in size, paid later in life, made shorter in 
duration, adjusted less than  fully to offset  inflation, and  pegged to 
nominal salaries at retirement. For many, benefits could be cut by over 
90 percent. The funding rate would be reduced by 75 percent, but the 
unfunded liability would fall only to about $390 billion. Work incentives 
would be dramatically altered; the reduction in pensions would amount 
to an overall pay cut of about 25 percent, and vesting would occur at 
ten years. The retention incentives would be materially reduced. 
The Grace Commission proposals are founded on the premise that 
the MRS has little impact on the retention of armed services members, 
and therefore even substantial reductions in pension  benefits would 
have little impact on the overall structure of the force. There is little 
systematic evidence about the responsiveness of retention behavior to 
pension compensation. Given the dramatic scale of changes contem- 
plated by the Grace Commission proposals, the effects could be sub- 
stantial, Leonard argues. 
In “Military  Hiring and Youth Employment,”  David Ellwood and 
David Wise estimate the effect of military hiring of youth on the civilian 
employment of youth. One of the most dramatic changes in the 1970s 
was a substantial reduction in the size and composition of the military. 
While these changes have been widely noted in popular discussion, 
they have received surprisingly little attention in the literature on youth 
employment. The silence may, in part, reflect uncertainty about how 
to treat the military. Most authors are interested primarily in assessing 
the performance of the civilian labor market, and data are almost always 
collected only for those in the civilian population. 
Nonetheless, the military is a major employer of  men between the 
ages of eighteen and twenty-four. Obviously, the need for military per- 
sonnel serves as an additional demand for labor for young men. At the 
same time, military employment is often regarded as very different 
from civilian employment. The working conditions, the skills ,  the com- 
mitment, and the risks may indeed differ enormously between the sec- 
tors, and the working conditions within the military obviously  vary 
depending on whether the country is at war. Moreover, the nature of 
the selection process for servicemen changes from year to year. In draft 
years, the proportion of the eligible population inducted and the rules 
for deferral or avoidance are quite variable.  With a volunteer army, 
rigid pay rules and working conditions may deter many of the most 6  DavidA. Wise 
able or educated young men, while the military may reject those with 
comparatively low skills. The vast complexity of the whole issue, cou- 
pled with poor data, probably has led most authors to ignore it entirely. 
Yet changes in the military over the past several decades have been 
dramatic and may have had a substantial impact on the youth labor 
market.  There has been a sizable long-term  decline in the relative 
number of young men in the military over the last three decades, in- 
terrupted by the Vietnam War. The decline in military manpower in 
the 1970s effectively increase the civilian labor force among eighteen- 
to twenty-four-year-olds at least as much as the baby boom did during 
this decade. 
Thus military employment clearly can affect the statistics that help 
us evaluate youth employment. But if  military employment is equiv- 
alent to civilian employment, what we have is largely an accounting 
problem. 
However, the reduction in the size of the military may well have a 
much more fundamental impact on the youth labor market. In the past 
the military has served as a mechanism for many youths to make the 
transition from school to work. The military may be an important way 
to accustom youths to the world of work, and it may provide major 
vocational training that enhances opportunities in the civilian labor 
force. 
Chapter 4, by Ellwood and Wise, asks, If  military employment is 
increased, does youth employment in the civilian sector decline? Or, 
conversely, If a youth is employed by the military, is there no decline 
in civilian employment? That is, does an additional youth employed 
by the military mean a net increase of one in the total number of youths 
employed? While  we  know that counting youths in the military  as 
employed substantially affects perceived trends in youth employment, 
the question here is more behavioral and requires statistical estimation. 
To answer this question, Ellwood and Wise use cross-section time 
series data by state, covering the period 1972-82.  They conclude that 
if  a black  youth is hired by the military, the total number of black 
youths employed is increased by one. That is, there will be no offset 
in the number of black youths employed in the civilian sector. Thus 
for black youths, military employment contributes substantially to the 
total number employed, they  conclude. If fewer black  youths were 
hired by the military, their employment picture would be even worse 
than it is. 
For white youths, the results are more ambiguous. The weight of the 
evidence suggests that military hiring of white youths is partially offset 
by reduced employment of white youths in the civilian sector. However, 
the offset is considerably less than one and may be closer to zero. 7  Overview 
In a companion chapter, “Uncle Sam Wants You-Sometimes:  Mil- 
itary Enlistments and the Youth Labor Market,”  Ellwood and Wise 
analyze military enlistments and the youth labor market. There has 
been little work done on the impact of military enlistment and service 
on youth labor markets. The research that has been done usually has 
been from the perspective of the military and has focused on the in- 
fluence labor market conditions have on military enlistment, particu- 
larly on enlistment by so-called high-quality recruits. In this chapter, 
as well as in the one just discussed, Ellwood and Wise focus on the 
inverse question, that is, What influence does the military have on 
youth labor markets? 
The military is often viewed as an employer of last resort. For those 
who meet its standards, the military offers at least one source of em- 
ployment. In that way, the military adds, on net, to the demand for 
youth. What is rarely considered, though, is that the military cannot 
possibly serve as the employer of last resort for all youths. Most authors 
assume that the military chooses a fixed quota of enlistment needs each 
year and adjusts the quality of its recruits to fill the quota. This notion 
implies that when the economy weakens, the military can afford to be 
more choosy. Thus, while the military may serve as an employer of 
last resort for highly desirable recruits, it is less likely to be an option 
for those deemed less desirable during bad economic times.  For the 
“weaker”  groups, employment opportunities in the military will tend 
to dry up just at the times when civilian opportunities do. 
Ellwood and Wise use a model to explore military hiring of various 
groups over the business cycle. They find that the military does serve 
as a kind of employer of last resort for youth groups deemed “high 
quality” by the military. For these groups, military enlistment is highly 
sensitive (in percentage terms) to economic conditions, but not very 
sensitive to their total employment, since only small proportions of 
these groups enlist even in poor economic times. By contrast, military 
enlistments seem to exaggerate the civilian economic conditions of 
those on the bottom rung of the military hiring ladder.  They are in 
excess supply to the military, and in poor economic times they tend to 
be supplanted by more qualified enlistees. The Ellwood-Wise results 
also imply that an expanding military will disproportionately benefit 
groups that generally fare less well in the labor market, such as non- 
whites and high school dropouts. 
The relationship between military service and the subsequent earn- 
ings of  youth on civilian jobs is the subject of Chapter 6, “Military 
Service and Civilian Earnings of Youths,”  by Jon Crane and David 
Wise. There are at least two reasons why military service could enhance 
earnings on civilian jobs. Typically, work experience leads to higher 8  David A.  Wise 
wage rates, and military work experience may substitute for civilian 
work experience in this respect. In addition, military enlistees might 
receive special training that is transferable to the private sector and 
leads to higher wages there. Indeed, recruitment advertisements often 
emphasize the training that military enlistees receive and that this train- 
ing will benefit the enlistee in subsequent civilian employment.  Ad- 
vertisements clearly refer both to the investment in human capital and 
to the certification that the military provides. Enlistees are trained in 
areas of  their choice and often get to work  with the latest in high- 
technology equipment. Moreover, the commercials point out, civilian 
employers are sure to be impressed with the kind of person who can 
make it in the military. 
The Crane and Wise analysis is based on the National Longitudinal 
Study of the High School Class of  1972 and on subsequent follow-up 
surveys conducted in 1973, 1974, 1976, and 1979. The primary advan- 
tage of this data set is that it follows the same youths from high school 
graduation through possible military enlistment and ultimately to jobs 
in the civilian labor market. 
Crane and Wise conclude that among the potential enlistees-indi- 
viduals with high school degrees and no further education-those  who 
in fact join the military are, by  standard measures of  quality, very 
similar to those who do  not join. The two groups have similar academic 
test scores and they performed at approximately the same level in their 
high  school classes. Both groups, however,  are quite different from 
those high school graduates who go on to four-year colleges. 
Crane and Wise also find that job experience in the civilian labor 
market is more valuable than job experience in the military in terms 
of wage increases in the civilian sector. However, military experience 
contributes to earnings in the civilian labor market. These results, the 
authors emphasize, do not mean that earnings in the military sector 
are lower than those in the private sector. Indeed, the Phillips-Wise 
chapter suggests  just the opposite. Nor do the results imply that military 
service is a poor choice for those who enlist, even if  they ultimately 
intend to follow career in the civilian sector. Those who enlist in the 
military before joining the private labor force may have faced relatively 
poor employment in the private sector upon graduation from high school. 
1.2  Civil Service versus Civilian Pay and Employment 
In chapter 7, Steven Venti analyzes “Wages in the Federal and Pri- 
vate Sectors.” He emphasizes that the legal principle of comparability 
has formally guided federal white-collor wage policy for the last twenty 
years. The legislation requires “federal pay rates be comparable with 
private enterprise pay rates for the same levels of work.” The principle 9  Overview 
has been interpreted and enforced to equalize wages between the fed- 
eral and private sectors. However, recent evidence suggests that this 
objective has not been attained. Work by Smith (1976, 1977, 1981) and 
Quinn (1979) indicates that federal workers may be “overpaid” relative 
to their private sector counterparts by as much as 15 percent to 20 
percent.  Inability to “explain”  pay differences by measured charac- 
teristics is interpreted as evidence that equal pay is not the rule. Unex- 
plained or residual differences in pay are seen as quasi rents to em- 
ployment to the higher-paying sector. 
Venti  addresses two interpretations  of  the unexplained  difference 
between public and private wages. The first is unobserved differences 
in the productivity of workers in each sector. Despite the availability 
of large samples and of detailed information in recent microdata files, 
Venti argues that it is not possible to capture fully all worker-specific 
differences. If workers are sorted between sectors on the basis of these 
unobserved factors, then the unexplained component of wage regres- 
sions may be individual differences rather than quasi rents. One goal 
of Venti’s analysis is to extend the previous wage regression approach 
to adjust for the effects of  observed and unobserved personal char- 
acteristics related to productivity. 
The second interpretation  of  the unexplained  difference between 
public and private sector wages is equalizing (or compensating) wage 
differences for nonpecuniary job attributes. Workers may perceive fun- 
damental differences between the public and private sectors. Distin- 
guishing features of each sector, which may be viewed either favorably 
or unfavorably by workers, include  stability of employment, oppor- 
tunity for internal promotion, unique nature of public service, pace of 
work, the bureaucratic work environment, and so forth. If  the return 
to a job is  viewed  as a package  including both wage and nonwage 
components, then part of any public-private wage difference may be 
an equalizing difference for the nonwage job attributes. If workers trade 
off wages for these job attributes, then a policy of equal wages between 
sectors may lead to a federal wage scale that neither equalizes overall 
returns to workers in  each sector nor elicits the appropriate  supply 
response. 
If  wage differences between sectors are, in part, equalizing differ- 
ences, how can one determine if the federal sector “overpays”? Venti’s 
approach is to judge whether the government overpays based on im- 
plicit queues for public sector jobs. If  the difference between public 
and private wage offers exceeds the amount necessary to offset the 
difference between nonwage aspects of the job, then there will be more 
individuals who desire government employment than there are jobs in 
the public  sector. The wage  differential  that  exactly  eliminates the 
queue is, in a simple supply sense, the comparable wage differential. 10  David A. Wise 
Venti formulates and estimates a model of  sectoral attachment, at 
the individual level, that permits a rough calculation of the length of 
implicit queues for federal sector jobs. He identifies determinants of 
worker preferences for federal sector employment and determinants 
of hiring choices in  the federal sector. The separate decisions of em- 
ployee and employer together determine whether the worker will be 
employed in the government sector. More important, identifying the 
separate decisions permits a test for the existence of queues for federal 
jobs: they reveal excess desired demand for government jobs at a given 
relative public-private wage. 
Venti concludes that, although much of  the gross differential in av- 
erage wages can be explained by differences in individual attributes, 
the federal sector still pays men about 4 percent more than does the 
private sector. Women in the public sector earn approximately 22 per- 
cent more  than  their  counterparts in  the private  sector.  Venti also 
attempts to estimate wage rates that would be required to eliminate 
queues for federal sector jobs. He concludes that in 1982 a 16 percent 
reduction in federal sector wages paid to men and a 42 percent reduction 
in wages paid to women would have eliminated queues. 
In chapter 8, Richard Freeman asks “How Do Public Sector Wages 
and Employment Respond to Economic Conditions?”  Nearly one in 
five employees in the United States works for some branch of govern- 
ment; one-fifth of employee earnings are paid by governments. In many 
labor markets, such as those for school teachers, protective service 
workers, health sector workers, and white-collar workers in general, 
government plays an even larger and sometimes predominant role on 
the demand side. 
How do governments act as employers? Are public sector wages and 
employment unresponsive to changing economic conditions, as is often 
held? Are government workers generally paid a premium over com- 
parable private sector workers, or do public-private pay differentials 
vary with economic conditions? What economic forces influence public 
pay and employment? These questions have rarely  been  addressed. 
The Freeman chapter sets out the basic facts about public sector wage 
and employment patterns in  the United States and then develops a 
relatively simple empirical model to answer them. 
Freeman finds that the pay of public sector workers relative to private 
sector workers varies greatly over time. Contrary to the view that pay 
in the public sector is inflexible, he finds that variations in relative pay 
are caused as much by fluctuations in public pay as by fluctuations in 
private pay. 
According to Freeman, the relatively highly paid worker in the public 
sector in the early  1970s lost much of  his or her advantage over oth- 
erwise comparable private sector workers within the span of a decade. 11  Overview 
The group of public sector workers who tend to be most highly paid 
relative to private sector workers are blacks and women, suggesting 
that the public sector may have a stronger equal employment or affir- 
mative action policy than the private sector. 
Differentials in public and private sector pay vary greatly depending 
on the nature of the comparisons. For example, Current Population 
Survey comparisons of individuals with similar broad human capital 
show federal employees to be  higher paid  than  private  employees; 
Bureau of Labor Statistics surveys of wage rates in particular occu- 
pations show federal workers to be lower paid. 
Moreover, public sector employment follows a very different pattern 
of change from private sector employment. There is less annual vari- 
ation in public sector than in private sector employment. The rate of 
growth of state and local employment tends to be countercyclical rather 
than cyclical; federal employment growth tends to be less procyclic or 
countercyclical than private employment growth. In terms of demo- 
graphic composition, the public sector employs relatively more blacks 
and women than the private sector, reinforcing the belief that the gov- 
ernment offers their workers better job opportunities than the private 
sector. 
Not surprisingly, budgets are a major determinant of state and local 
public sector wages and employment. An increase in the ratio of bud- 
gets to GNP raises relative employment by much more than it raises 
relative wages.  Because of differences in the response of the public 
sector versus the private sector to broad economic developments, pub- 
lic sector employment rises relatively in recessions and falls relatively 
in booms, while relative wages move in the opposite direction. More- 
over, relative employment in the state and local public sector tends to 
fall in periods of rapid inflation. By contrast, federal wages and em- 
ployment, which constitute only a small proportion of  budgets and 
which can be paid for by deficit financing, do not exhibit a well-defined 
relationship to various measures of  budget size. 
Howard Frant and Herman Leonard analyze government pension 
plans in chapter 9, “Promise Them Anything: The Incentive Structures 
of  Local Public Pension  Plans.”  Public pension  systems have been 
greatly criticized, but there has been  relatively  little  study of  their 
details. While studies of federal pension plans have revealed substantial 
accumulations of unfunded liabilities facing future taxpayers, both gov- 
ernment and private studies of state and local pension plans have in- 
dicated that these problems are common, though not universal, in lower- 
level jurisdictions as well. Some studies have considered the aggregate 
impacts of these plans, but little attention has been paid to the level 
and form of the incentives they create. The differences across juris- 
dictions are frequently dramatic.  The evolution  of  pension arrange- 12  David A. Wise 
ments in different jurisdictions appears to have led to a considerable 
degree of customization-local  variations in plan features. The level 
and timing of pension benefits and of the accrual of pension rights by 
employees-and  the work incentives thereby created-are  quite vol- 
atile across plans. 
Frant and Leonard discuss whether trying to account for these vari- 
ations using an optimal contracting perspective provides the most plau- 
sible explanation. They examine 94 public pension plans for local em- 
ployees from thirty-three states. Of these, 67 cover general employees 
or teachers, and 27  cover police or fire employees. Some plans are 
state administered; most are administered locally. The plans they de- 
scribe are investigated in Arnold (1983); Frant and Leonard use a subset 
that has adequate data for their examination. These systems cover more 
than 2.9 million employees. However, Frant and Leonard emphasize 
that the plans do not represent a random sample, so the statistics they 
cite  should  be  taken  as  roughly  indicative  rather  than  precisely 
descriptive. 
They seek to describe the character and variety of public pension 
plans, to examine the roles played by certain features of these plans, 
and to assess their relative importance. They focus on the time profile 
of pension wealth and on wealth accruals. Accrual of pension wealth 
is the increment to a worker’s  wealth in a given year as a result of 
increases in pension rights granted in that year. Accruals of pension 
wealth are thus an element of total worker compensation; to understand 
the time profile and consequent incentive effects of public compen- 
sation, we need to understand the time profile of pension accruals. 
This work closely parallels research by Kotlikoff and Wise (1984) 
describing private sector plans. But there are two possibly contradic- 
tory reasons why we might be interested in looking at public sector 
plans.  First, they may have different labor market properties or be 
determined by different factors than private sector plans. Second, be- 
cause these plans are not covered by Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA), they represent a less “constrained” and there- 
fore richer universe of possible features. 
Frant and Leonard find substantial variation in the level and form 
of state and local pension plans across jurisdictions.  They conclude 
that it is hard to believe that the differences can be realistically attrib- 
uted to optimal contracting. They emphasize that the customization of 
plan features in some jurisdictions provides incentives so complex as 
to appear inconsistent with any rational objective. It is possible, they 
suggest, that the money that provides these incentives is not particu- 
larly well spent. 
Two alternatives seem worth considering, they say. First, in simpler 
plans the incentives are easier for workers to comprehend, and they 13  Overview 
are less likely to differ across workers in bizarre ways. Complex in- 
teractions of early retirement penalties, entitlements to pension rights 
defined discontinuously in terms of age and service, and other custom 
features of some public plans create accrual spikes without having any 
obviously beneficial incentive implications. Simplifying plans that cur- 
rently have such features might well result in more (or more appro- 
priate) incentives per dollar of required funding. 
Second, the incentives would be much clearer if the plans were on 
a defined contribution basis.  Both workers and taxpayers could then 
see directly both the timing and the magnitude of the incentives pro- 
vided-as  well as their cost. 
In short, Frant and Leonard conclude that pension payments are an 
important  component of  labor income in the state and local public 
sector. To  fully fund these plans, funding rates would need to average 
about  15 percent of total compensation.  (Comparable private sector 
funding rates are about 5 percent, according to Kotlikoff and Wise.) 
The plans differ dramatically across jurisdictions in form, in timing, in 
level, and in the incentives they provide workers. Some are so complex 
that their incentive patterns appear to have arisen more by accident 
than by design. They may also be too complex to be fully understood 
by workers. This in itself may be a reason to simplify some of the more 
complicated plans. 
In chapter 10, Ronald Ehrenberg and Robert Smith consider “Com- 
parable Worth in the Public Sector.” It is common knowledge that, on 
average, women earn less than men, are distributed across occupations 
quite differently from men, and that earnings in occupations dominated 
by women tend to be lower than in those occupations dominated by 
men, even after controlling for traditional proxies for productivity. The 
frustrations generated by these outcomes have led to pressure for the 
adoption of the principle of comparable worth. 
Proponents of comparable worth assert that jobs within a firm can 
be valued in terms of the skill, effort, and responsibility they require, 
as well as the working conditions they offer. Two jobs would be said 
to be of comparable worth to a firm if they were comparable in terms 
of  these characteristics.  The principle  of  comparable worth  further 
asserts that, within a firm, jobs of comparable worth should receive 
equal compensation. 
While some efforts to implement comparable worth have taken place 
in the private sector, the major push for comparable worth has occurred 
in the state and local government sector. By the mid-1960s over a dozen 
states had passed comparable worth legislation covering state employ- 
ees, although these laws were rarely enforced. Starting with a  1974 
study in the state of Washington, a number of states have undertaken 
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with the principle of comparable worth. In several cases this has led 
to “voluntary”  implementation of comparable worth through the leg- 
islative and collective bargaining processes (e.g., Minnesota) or to court- 
ordered implementation (Washington). By 1984, nine states had begun 
the process of implementing some form of comparable worth in their 
employees’ compensation systems. Comparable worth initiatives have 
also been undertaken at the local level. Many of these were in Cali- 
fornia, Minnesota, and Washington. 
Ehrenberg and Smith begin with a discussion of the cases for and 
against  comparable worth, from  the perspective  of  analytical labor 
economists. They use simple labor market models and stress the key 
assumptions that influence whether  the policy  might  be  considered 
desirable. Ultimately, they conclude that the debate over comparable 
worth must involve a consideration of the trade-off between efficiency 
and equity. They then discuss some of the conceptual and operational 
problems of implementing such a scheme. 
First, they address the attempts by various states to conduct com- 
parable worth job evaluation studies in which wages are related to total 
job evaluation points and discrimination is inferred if, on average, female- 
dominated occupations receive lower wages than male-dominated oc- 
cupations with  comparable total evaluation points.  The authors ask 
whether it is reasonable to simply sum up points for the different job 
evaluation factors (e.g.,  training, job responsibility,  working condi- 
tions) to get a total score for each job, for this assumes that employers 
“value”  an additional point  of  each factor equally. Using a hedonic 
wage equation approach  and  data from job evaluation studies con- 
ducted in Minnesota, Washington, and Connecticut, they estimate em- 
pirically whether the  weights these states assign to each factor are 
equal. If  they are not, then how does this affect estimates of male- 
female comparable worth gaps. They also test whether functional form 
assumptions affect these estimates. 
Ehrenberg and Smith emphasize that total compensation on a job 
includes opportunities for occupational mobility and subsequent wage 
growth. The state studies they  consider  ignore these opportunities, 
assuming implicitly that male-female current wage differentials for given 
point scores through job evaluation are not compensated for by op- 
portunities for wage growth. The authors use data on state and local 
government employees in New York  State from the 1970 Census of 
Population to illustrate how one might test this assumption indirectly. 
Ehrenberg and Smith point out that to the extent that public em- 
ployers’ employment decisions are sensitive to their employees’ wage 
rates, one would expect to observe relative wage changes leading re- 
spectively to (1) the substitution of some male for some female em- 
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employment in male-dominated occupations for some employment in 
female-dominated occupations; (3) the substitution of  some employ- 
ment  in  male-dominated functions for some employment in female- 
dominated functions; and (4)  a decline in the aggregate level of public 
employment. For all these reasons, comparable worth wage adjust- 
ments  (CWWA)  might  be  expected  to lead  to  a  decline  in  female 
employment. 
Ehrenberg and Smith find that existing estimates of comparable worth 
wage gaps in Connecticut, Minnesota, and Washington are relatively 
insensitive to the functional form of the earnings equation estimated. 
On the other hand, the authors are highly skeptical about what these 
job evaluation systems are actually measuring. They conclude that if 
job evaluation systems are to be used  in comparable worth studies, 
they should be designed more thoughtfully. They also find little evi- 
dence that intraoccupational male-female employment ratios are sen- 
sitive to intraoccupational male-female wage ratios or that the occu- 
pational  distribution of  employment is sensitive to the occupational 
distribution of wages. 
Ehrenberg and Smith stress that a CWWA policy would have addi- 
tional repercussions.  Some males in the sector would also lose their 
jobs; if these displaced males and females sought employment in the 
private sector, then there would be downward pressure on wages there. 
Indeed, they conclude that if  a CWWA policy were confined to the 
public sector, women as a group might not benefit; the higher wages 
for women employed in the public sector might be offset at least par- 
tially by resulting lower wages for women in the private sector. 
In the final chapter, Charles Manski examines “Academic Ability, 
Earnings, and the Decision to Become a Teacher.”  Perceived  short- 
comings in the quality of American education at the elementary and 
secondary school levels have drawn much public attention recently. In 
particular, there has been prominent concern with the composition of 
the teacher force. 
This concern presumably arises out of  the juxtaposition  of  three 
factors: First, it is generally accepted that educational achievement is 
influenced by the ability of the teachers who guide the learning process. 
(Of  course,  there  is  much  less  agreement  about  how  educational 
achievement and teacher ability should be measured.) Second, there 
is often an expressed  dissatisfaction with the distribution of  ability 
within the present teaching force. Third, there is a common perception 
that feasible changes in public policy can generate a shift in the dis- 
tribution of ability of the supply of teachers. In particular, it is asserted 
that merit pay, general increases in teacher salaries, and/or subsidi- 
zation of  the college education of prospective teachers would induce 
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We  can only assess the various proposals for increasing the attrac- 
tiveness of teaching in an informed way if  we forecast the extent to 
which they would influence the decisions about the occupational choice 
of  high-ability young adults if  enacted. Until now, there has been no 
basis for such forecasts. In the absence of empirical analysis, we can 
only guess at the impact of  changes in teacher salaries on the quality 
of the teaching force. 
Manski examines the relationship between academic ability, earn- 
ings, and the decision to become a teacher through analysis of data 
from a national sample of college graduates. The National Longitudinal 
Study of the High School Class of 1972 (NLS72) surveyed 22,652 high 
school seniors in the spring of 1972 and has subsequently followed this 
panel as its members have progressed through postsecondary education 
and into the labor force. The most recent survey took place in October 
1979. At  that  time,  18,630 members of  the panel were  successfully 
contacted. Of these, 3,502 reported having completed a bachelor’s de- 
gree in 1976 or 1977. Of this group, 2,952 reported they were working 
in October 1979. Of  these, 510 reported that they were employed as 
teachers. 
From these data Manski finds that among the working NLS72 re- 
spondents who have received a bachelor’s  degree, the frequency of 
choice of teaching as an occupation is inversely related to academic 
ability. This finding is true whether academic ability is measured by 
SAT score or by high school class rank. Holding SAT scores constant, 
though, the frequency of choice of teaching does not vary with class 
rank. 
For a given sex and level of academic ability, teacher’s earnings are 
much lower, on average, than those of other working college graduates. 
For women alone, or men alone, the earnings of teachers tend to rise 
only slightly, if at all, with academic ability. In other occupations, a 
relationship between earnings and ability is more noticeable, but is still 
weak. In fact, academic ability explains only a small part of the ob- 
served variation in earnings with the cohort of NLS72 college graduates. 
For a given level of academic ability and a given occupation, males 
consistently have higher earnings than females. The sex differential in 
earnings is relatively small in teaching, but quite pronounced in other 
occupations. The rate at which earnings rise with ability is very similar 
for males and females. 
To evaluate policy proposals intended to influence the composition 
of the teaching force, we must go beyond the descriptive analysis. The 
NLS72 data allow us to estimate an econometric model that explains 
occupational choice as a function of the earnings and nonmonetary 
characteristics associated with alternative occupations. With this model 
it is possible  to forecast the consequences  of  policies that  combine 17  Overview 
increases in teacher salaries with the institution of minimum academic 
ability standards for teacher certification. 
Manskl’s forecasts suggest the following: In the absence of  a mini- 
mum ability standard, increases in teacher earnings would yield sub- 
stantial growth in the size of the teaching force but minimal improve- 
ment  in  the  average  academic  ability  of  teachers.  Under  present 
conditions, the aggregate wage elasticity of the supply of teachers ap- 
pears to be in the range of two to three. As wages increase, both high- 
and low-ability students are attracted into teaching, so the ability com- 
position of the teaching force changes little. 
If teacher salaries are not increased, institution of a minimum ability 
standard improves the average ability of the teaching force but reduces 
its  size.  Establishment of  a standard sufficient to raise the average 
academic ability of teachers to the average of all college graduates may 
reduce the size of the teaching force by 20 percent. 
The average ability of the teaching force can be improved while the 
size of the teaching force is maintained if  minimum ability standards 
are combined with sufficient salary increases. It appears that the av- 
erage academic ability of  teachers can be raised to the average of all 
college graduates if a minimum SAT score (verbal plus math) of 800 is 
required for teacher certification and if  teacher salaries are raised by 
about 10 percent over their present levels. To achieve further improve- 
ments in average teacher ability without reducing the size of the teach- 
ing force would require a higher minimum ability standard combined 
with a larger salary increase. 
Manski emphasizes that the indicators of ability available in the NLS72 
panel and which he used in his research are very specific measures of 
academic success, namely SAT scores and high school class rank. It 
seems reasonable to assume that these variables are positively asso- 
ciated with  performance as a teacher,  but formal  evidence for this 
proposition is lacking. The relevance of his analysis to the debate over 
the quality of the teacher  force therefore depends on the extent to 
which academic ability and teaching ability coincide. 
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